The Marketing Devil is Really in the Details

It’s a fine line between an audacious-yet-successful marketing stunt and a total disaster. So fine that most marketing executives in charge of brands who have anything at all to lose often defer to safer approaches. Recently though a couple of daring and brilliant stunts have caught my attention, deserving a post with some deeper insight.

Much has been written about TriNet’s Yam Trader idea. Gust was among the hundreds of companies that received a yam in the mail (literally), prompting our CEO to stop by and visit their booth at SXSW. I later connected with TriNet’s Director of Marketing Ken Narita, who was wonderfully open to share their experience. As Ken described, the idea came about when they were faced with the reality that it would not be easy to break through the clutter at SXSW. A bold and funny execution would fit well with SXSW, where creativity abounds and formalities are practically non-existent, enabling companies to go a little wild with very limited negative repercussions to their brands. Hundreds of CEOs of target companies were sent yams, along with an offer to bring them to their SXSW booth to redeem their gift certificate. In addition, people were directed to YamTrader.com, a campaign micro site that re-directed them to TriNet’s real website. Ken reported that the initiative was very successful, with a conversion rate (herein defined as people who brought their yam to the SXSW company booth) in the double digits. While the definition of conversion here does not equate converting a prospect into a customer, Ken estimates TriNet was able to schedule at least 50 meetings as a result of this stunt, in addition to all the great publicity and increased brand awareness that was generated as a result of this bold direct marketing initiative (isn’t it great when a side effect of a direct marketing effort is brand awareness?). Similarly, Unreal Candy had the Easter Bunny go around SXSW apologizing to people for all the bad candy he’d been giving them all these years (Unreal Candy is the maker of all-natural, unprocessed candy). Albeit practically risk-free, this stunt was remarkably simple and creative, generating huge word-of-mouth activity and positive brand coverage.

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How Reed Hastings’ Facebook Status Update Landed Netflix in SEC’s Crosshairs

Reed Hastings headshotLast month, the SEC announced it was taking action regarding Netflix’ (NFLX) securities compliance based on a Facebook status update posted by CEO Reed Hastings.  The move came as a shock to many in the tech business community, in which we’ve become accustomed to real-time disclosure by company executives through social media.  What could be wrong with more transparency?

To understand the SEC’s point of view, it’s necessary to review the principles underlying securities law in the United States.  Compressing 80 years of history into a paragraph, securities regulation here is fundamentally a disclosure-based system.  With a few exceptions (notably corporate governance requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002), beginning with the original Securities Act of 1933, Congress and the SEC adopted a philosophy that financial markets work best when investors are free to make their own decisions based on timely, complete and accurate disclosure by publicly traded companies.  Modern theories of economics and finance teach us that in a world of perfect information, the market will decide what a fair price is for any company’s stock at any point in time based on its current financial condition, results of past operations, analysts’ forecasts of future performance, industry conditions and so on.

The key words worth repeating here are “perfect information.”  Like all forms of perfection in an imperfect world, it exists as an aspirational goal, not in reality.  Certain people inside a company will always know more than the general public.  This is why insider trading can be a criminal act:  Trading on the basis of material nonpublic information that would affect the stock price is a form of cheating, taking advantage of those who lack access to the same information.  The person or business on the other end of an insider trade is at an automatic disadvantage.

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Antone Johnson , Founding Principal, Bottom Line Law Group
January 31st, 2013 1

The Experience vs. Education Curve in Startups

Years ago I came across the idea that in entrepreneurship, education and experience contribute to likelihood of success roughly like you see in the chart here. The underlying assumption is that a lot of education makes up for very little experience, and vice-versa. And this is in the context of startups, investment, and entrepreneurship. 

education vs. experienceI’ve drawn it here MBA style, with a line on two axes, pretty much the way I first saw it, with a smooth curve from one extreme to the other. It’s almost symmetrical in this drawing, and would be even more so if I had better tools (who wants to devise an equation? I just drew it.) The idea is some sort of a conceptual break-even point between the two factors. 

I think it makes sense in a broad view, but my experience — as angel investor lately, as entrepreneur before that, and startup dabbler still — makes me think it should be skewed. This is my opinion, based on (how nice) education and experience. And this relates to how I look at startups as potential investments for the angel group I’m in (WAC) : 

  1. There’s no amount of education that has much likelihood of success with no experience whatsoever. The curve should move slightly up and to the left. 
  2. I believe the sweet spot on the curve is in the middle. 
  3. My own experience with an MBA degree — which I got later than most, already 30+, but also before I started my own business, and was a co-founder of one that went public — was that the MBA gave me a general overview that made entrepreneurship easier. 
  4. However, through several decades of working in this area, I’ve come to think that most MBAs need to temper all those analytical skills with real-world experience before they can really make progress. So an MBA five years out of biz school tends to be way more valuable than one who just graduated. Then again, I have an obvious bias. 
  5. I’ve seen very little evidence that an undergraduate business degree increases likelihood of startup success more than a good undergraduate degree in science, math, engineering, or — yes, I’ll stand by this one — even liberal arts. In fact, I’ve seen a lot of evidence for the latter: that any other degree is a better indicator than a business degree. 

However, one big caveat: I’m guilty in the above of one-size-fits-all thinking. The huge bias towards my way of doing things. So take all of this as just one opinion. 

Do you agree? What are your thoughts? I posted it here because the discussion intrigues me, not because I think I’m right. 

Tim Berry , Founder, Palo Alto Software
January 9th, 2013 3

How many start-ups in the US get seed/VC funding per year?

In very general terms, roughly 1,500 startups get funded by venture capitalists in the US, and 50,000 by angel investors. VCs look at around 400 companies for every one in which they invest; angels look at 40.

There are several million “startups” that are formed each year, so one way of looking at it is that there are several million “great people with a good idea who give up because they just cannot get initial funding”.

On the other hand, those VCs and angel investors spend all their time proactively seeking the best companies they can find, and despite their concerted efforts at picking the best of the best, fully half of the ones they do fund will go out of business with a couple of years. Looked at that way, of the 50,000-60,000 deals that get funded each year 30,000 of them should not have been funded (let alone the other few million who wanted funding)… therefore there are no really great people with really great ideas who go unfunded.

Of course, the reality lies somewhere between those two extremes, but my personal guess, as someone who is familiar with the issue from both sides of the table, is that “lack of available funding for truly deserving deals” is not one of the biggest challenges facing entrepreneurship in the US.

*original post can be found on Quora @ : http://www.quora.com/David-S-Rose/answers *

Founders Learn One Day at a Time Like Everybody Else

I like this a lot. The executive summary: 

Dropbox Co-Founder Drew Houston believes false mythologies about tech company founders do a disservice to aspiring entrepreneurs. While many people think all tech founders start with world conquering visions, says Houston, the reality is that founders learn one day at a time just like everyone else.

This less-than-two-minute video comes from Stanford’s Ecorner, its online entrepreneurship center, which is a great resource. 

If you don’t see the video embedded here, you can click here to see it on the original source.

Tim Berry , Founder, Palo Alto Software
October 16th, 2012 2

How does Convertible Debt work?

Let’s start by understanding that because we are talking about something called “Convertible Debt”, it means that whatever it is will start out as one thing, and potentially convert (or “change”) into something else. In this case, what the investor receives in exchange for his or her cash starts out as debt, and potentially converts into equity.

Debt is a fancy word for a “loan”. That is, I lend you money, and you agree to pay back the money that I loaned you at some known point in the future, along with a specific additional amount of money (called “interest”) which is your payment to me for having been willing to loan you money in the first place.

Equity is a fancy word for “ownership”. That is, I give you money and you give me part ownership of the company. Because I’m now an owner right alongside you, you don’t ever have to pay back the money to me (remember, it wasn’t a loan), and even if the company goes broke you still won’t owe me a penny. HOWEVER, also because I’m now an owner right alongside you, I get my share of any increase in value that ever happens with the company.

The difference here is that debt results in a fixed payback regardless of whether good things or bad things happen to the company, while equity results in completely variable payback from $0 (if the company goes under) to potentially billions of dollars (if the company ends up being worth a lot of money.)

The key functional aspect of these two very different things is that if I’m putting, say $100,000 into your company as debt, the only thing we need to discuss is the interest rate that you’ll pay me for using my money until you pay it back. But if I’m putting it in as equity, then we need to decide what percentage of the company’s ownership I will end up with in exchange for my investment. To figure that out, we use the following math equation:

[Amount I'm Investing] ÷ [Company Value] = [Percent Ownership]

Therefore, since we can calculate any one of the three terms if we know the remaining two, and we already know how much I’m investing (remember, we said $100,000), in order to figure out what my ownership percentage will be after the investment, you and I need to agree on a way to figure out what the company valuation is (or will be) at the time I purchase my shares of stock.

So, if I were just going to buy stock in your company today, we would agree on a valuation today, I’d give you the money today, you’d give me the appropriate percentage of the company’s stock, and we’d be all set. But that’s NOT what we’re doing.

Instead, I’m loaning you the money today (for which, as you’ll recall, there is no need to set a valuation on the company). HOWEVER, since I really don’t want only my money back plus a little interest (heck, I can get that just by putting my money in a bank account, instead of into a very risky startup), we agree that at some point in the future I will be able to convert my loan into the equivalent of cash, and use that money to buy stock in the company.

But because that conversion is going to be happening at some point in the future, while I’m giving you the money today, we need to figure out a few things today, before I am willing to give you the money. Specifically, we need to decide (a) when in the future the debt will convert to equity, and (b) how we will decide the valuation of the company at that point in the future.

The answer to both turns out to be the same thing: we will wait until a richer, more experienced investor comes around and agrees to buy equity in the company. At that point we will convert the debt into equity(a) and we will use as the valuation whatever that other investor is using(b). However, the fact is that I was willing to invest in your company at a time when that other big shot investor was not, and you used my investment to make the company a lot more valuable (and therefore got a high valuation from the other investor) so it doesn’t seem fair that I should bear the early stage risk, but get the same reward as a later stage investor, right?

We solve this problem by agreeing that I will get a discount (typically anywhere from 10% to 30%) to whatever the other investor sets the valuation at…which is why we call this a Discounted Convertible Note.

But you know what? Although that sounds fair, it really isn’t  (or at least serious investors don’t think it is.) That’s because the more successful you are at using my original money to increase the value of the company, the higher the valuation the next guy will have to pay…and pretty soon the little discount I’m getting doesn’t seem so fair after all! For instance, if that same big shot investor would have valued your company in the early days at, say $1 million, but is eventually willing to invest in you at a valuation of, say, $5 million, that means you were able to increase the company’s value 500% using my original seed money.

But if my convertible note says that it will convert at only a 20% discount to that $5 million, for example (which, if you do the math, is $4 million), I would seem to have made a very, very bad deal! Why? Because I end up paying for your stock based on a $4 million valuation, instead of the $1 million it was worth in its early days when i was willing to make my risky investment! No fair!

So how do we solve this problem? What we do is say “OK, because I’m investing early, I’ll get the 20% discount on whatever valuation the next guy gives you…BUT just to be sure that things don’t get crazy, we will also say that regardless of whatever crazy valuation HE is willing to give you, in no case will the valuation at which MY debt converts ever be higher than, say, $1 million.” That figure is known as the “cap”, because it establishes the highest price at which my debt can ever convert to equity.

And that is why we call this form of investment (which these days is used by most angel investors) a Discounted Convertible Note with a Cap.

*original post can be found on Quora @ : http://www.quora.com/David-S-Rose/answers *

What do investors consider the most important aspect of a potential deal?

Characteristics of the Entrepreneur
Integrity, Passion, Startup Experience, Domain Expertise, Functional Skills, Leadership, Commitment, Vision, Pragmatism, Flexibility, Personality

Characteristics of the Venture
Team, Business Model, Traction, Customer Acquisition, Scalability, Defensibiity, Capital Efficiency, Churn, Time to Breakeven, Exit Strategy

Characteristics of the Market
Size, Growth, Concentration, Geography, Demographics, Competition, Channels, Regulatory Environment, Technological Developments, Adjacent Markets,

Characteristics of the Deal
Valuation, Size of Raise, Amount of Investment, Form of Investment, Liquidation Waterfall, Option Pool, Board Composition, Anti-Dilution Rights, Protective Provisions, Founder Vesting,

*original post can be found on Quora @ : http://www.quora.com/David-S-Rose/answers *